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Inequality within advanced countries has returned to levels typical of a century ago. At the global 
level it remains extremely high despite the rapid growth of major developing countries such as 
China, India and Brazil. This makes inequality a major economic issue, social problem and political 
challenge in today’s capitalism. However, economic inequality is the object of limited research 
efforts and attracts modest attention in the political arena.This is the result of several factors. 
 Mainstream approaches view inequality as a necessary condition – or, at best, an unfortunate side 
effect - for achieving the more general objectives of economic growth and market efficiency. Most 
studies emphasise that inequality is to a large extent the consequence of international forces laying 
beyond the reach of policies by nation-states. More importantly, today’s inequality is the result of a 
variety of processes that have seriously increased its complexity, with major changes in its nature 
and mechanisms, compared to past decades. To the fundamental divide between capital and labour 
in the distribution of income between social classes and groups, new mechanisms have been added, 
that have fuelled income inequalities among individuals, rooted in the rise of top incomes, 
technological change, international production, labour markets, influence of families of origin and 
lack of intergenerational mobility.  
In this paper we propose an overall interpretation of the trajectory of inequality. The functional 
income distribution that leads to inequalities in factor incomes, with an increasing divide between 
the growing share of profits and financial rents – free to move across national borders, escape 
taxation and search for speculative gains – and the dwindling share of wages, nation-bound and 
unable to escape taxes. The specificity of top incomes – that combine rents, profits and “superstar” 
labour compensation complicates this picture with the effects of pro-rich policy changes. 
Inequalities have also strongly increased within wages, resulting from several factors. Education has 
an obvious influence, but plays a much smaller role than mainstream views would expect. Skill 
differences are increasingly important, and need to be examined in the context of specific 
professional groups, rather than with wide generalisations. Industry specificities, technology and 
international production do play a role, but in complex ways, depending on the nature of innovative 
strategies, local competences, market power and demand dynamics. Labour market arrangements – 
unionisation, presence of minimum wages or national contracts, diffusion of temporary or part-time 
labour contracts, etc. – are increasingly important factors in explaining the low pay of many young 
and low-skilled workers. Outside labour markets and the opportunities for social mobility promised 
by education, the family of origin remains a major determinant of individuals’ education and 
incomes, with an increasingly strong persistence of inequality across generations. 
The interpretation we provide offers a new explanation of the nature of today’s economic 
inequalities, of its consequences, and possible remedies. 
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Inequality within advanced countries has returned to levels typical of a century ago. At the global 
level it remains extremely high despite the rapid growth of major developing countries such as 
China, India and Brazil. This makes inequality a major economic issue, social problem and political 
challenge in today’s capitalism. However, economic inequality is the object of limited research 
efforts and attracts modest attention in the political arena; despite important advances in the 
knowledge of its dimensions, a convincing understanding of the mechanisms at its roots is still 
lacking. 
A first possible explanation is that, in mainstream thinking, economic inequality is conceived as a 
necessary condition – or, at best, an unfortunate side effect - for achieving the more general 
objectives of economic growth and market efficiency. This highly questionable conviction can 
explain part of the neglect fallen on the analysis of high inequality and on policies addressing it.  
A second (and related) factor is the perception that inequality is to a large extent the consequence of 
international or global forces, laying beyond the reach of nation-states where policy measures for 
countering inequality can best be designed and implemented. Indeed, the forces shaping inequality a 
century ago were mainly rooted in the income distribution of national economies; today, they tend 
to be to a significant extent global processes – increased cross-border flows of capitals, goods, 
workers and knowledge; the rise and fall of industries and specializations; international production 
by multinational firms; wage setting influenced by distant locations, etc. The ability of national 
policies to address such developments has greatly diminished and national governments have 
apparently chosen to accept their powerlessness and to make their citizens learn to live with high 
inequality, rather than striving to understand and counter the forces of inequality and their most 
unacceptable outcomes. Moreover, no international political authority has emerged with the 
mandate to address and regulate the unequal outcomes of cross border processes. 
There is, however, a further and more general reason for the lack of explanations for today’s 
inequality. It is the high complexity of a phenomenon that is changing over time and has now a 
different nature from past decades. For most of the 20th century the roots of inequality were in the 
transition from agricultural to industrial societies, in the resulting class structure and in the 
functional distribution of income between capital and labour. Today, capitals and firms are engaged 
in greater competition and experience unequal economic fortunes. Labour markets are increasingly 
segmented and workers are divided by gender, between white and blue collars, knowledge and 
manual workers, permanent and temporary employees, local and migrant labour, not to mention the 
various forms of unemployment.  
A century ago the class structure of societies could broadly account for inequalities in incomes, 
status and opportunities. Today class identities are blurred, inequalities within workers are deeper 
and new aspects play a role. The inequality experienced by individuals is shaped by a combination 
of factors including class, gender and ethnic status, education and professional skills, type of 
employment and access to social rights and public services, opportunities for social mobility within 
and between generations. In the past being member of a social group, in particular of the class of 
workers rather than of capitalists, was enough to make a reliable prediction as to one’s position in 
the social ladder. Today, individuals’ positions are the result of a variety of factors, new 
mechanisms shape the economic conditions of particular groups and inequality within members of 
relatively homogenous social categories may be very high. This overlapping of dimensions of 
inequality - with individuals located at different intersections of such characteristics - results in a 
strong complexity which defies old approaches to inequality. Such complexity may have 
discouraged academic research, social mobilitazion and policy action. As a result there is only 
limited understanding of the mechanisms of inequality, and of the actions that could effectively 
counter it. 
This paper explores the crucial features of today’s inequality which can highlight its complexity and 
provide a better understanding of its mechanisms. We argue that crucial aspects of today’s 4 
 
inequality are not considered by mainstream approaches and that no overall and integrated 
explanation has been produced. In particular, we want to draw attention to the following specific 
dimensions of inequality: the changing relationship between functional and personal distribution of 
income; the dynamics and specificities of top incomes; the large share of earnings inequality not 
explained by human capital and the role played by labour contracts and institutions; the importance 
of industry specificities in technological activities, international production and social relations in 
shaping wage inequality; the relationship between current inequality and its intergenerational 
transmission; the weak response of the welfare state and of the political process.  
In the next sections we provide an overview of the changing views of inequality in economic 
studies, we summarise the main quantitative evidence on the different dimensions of inequality and 
we focus on the key features that are needed to improve or amend existing analyses of inequality, 
leading to a more comprehensive explanation.  
 
Changing views of inequality 
 
Economic inequality is a changing phenomenon; its forces evolve over time and even a similar level 
of disparities may be the results of different mechanisms and patterns of distribution. Economic 
ideas on inequality have evolved accordingly. 
For Classical economists inequality was defined by the class structure of industrial capitalism and 
by the distribution of income between capital and labour. The relationships between patterns of 
distribution, economic growth and social reproduction were a key concern in their analysis 
industrialisation.  
Marx emphasised the contradiction between industrial capitalism’s potential for progress and its 
outcome - capital accumulation for the capitalist class, and commodified labour, limited wages and 
hard social conditions for workers and the dispossesed. Increasing inequalities – relative to the 
poorer but more equal pre-industrial societies - were the result of the very nature of capitalist 
accumulation. 
Problems of distribution and inequalities “disappeared” in Neoclassical approaches behind widely 
accepted – and surprisingly long-living - assumptions. At the macroeconomic level, the 
compensation of factors of production was assumed to be equal to their marginal productivity; at 
the individual level, incomes were simply the result of choices on work, investment and 
consumption that resulted from individual utilities. Freedom of choice and market efficiency could 
justify any (unequal) distributional outcome, with no consequence for economic growth, and no 
room for the principles of social justice, human rights, nor for redistributive policies. The Great 
Depression of the 1930s proved how unrealistic such assumptions were and how disastrous their 
policy implications. 
In the post-war period, the link between income distribution and growth returned at the centre of 
Keynesian approaches, with two distinct mechanisms; on the demand side, wages were seen as a 
major source of aggregate demand; on the supply side, accumulation – financed by savings – was 
needed to expand productive capacities. The main concern of Kaldorian models (Kaldor, 1956) and 
post-Keynesian perspectives (Robinson, 1960) was to identify the distributive patterns that were 
consistent with sustained growth, recognising a major role for government action in supporting both 
accumulation and demand – through public expenditure and redistribution that could support the 
lowest incomes and reduce inequality. Moreover, insights from welfare economics informed the 
normative models for economic policy aiming at redistribution, pointing out the trade-offs between 
efficiency and equity in static and dynamic contexts. 
The empirical regularities of such processes were pointed out by Kuznets (1965) who documented 
the inverted-U relationship between levels of inequality and countries’ per capita income; 
industrialization and growth would first increase inequalities, which would then decline as a result 
of redistribution and more balanced growth.  5 
 
Indeed, as a result of economic growth, social change and public policies for redistribution and 
welfare, Europe and the US experienced a reduction in inequalities in the 1970s; one of the side 
effects – possibly - was that for several decades inequality became a rarely explored field of 
economic research, with few specialized studies.  
A new attention emerged in the early 1990s – following the new rise in inequality that had started 
the 1980s as a result of neoliberal policies – with studies that moved from the functional 
distribution of income between social classes to inequalities among individuals. Class divisions had 
become less clear cut and homogeneous, and gender, ethnicity, education and professional 
qualification had become major factors in explaining the personal distribution of income. New 
studies addressed these issues and started to measure such more complex patterns of inequality 
among individuals (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000; Brandolini and Smeeding, 2008). 
At the same time, philosophical and economic perspectives started to address the issues of justice, 
ethics, equality of opportunities, inter-generational inequality. Liberal theories of justice stated the 
primacy of individuals’ freedom of choice and explored the possibilities of reducing inequality 
without limiting liberty. Rawls (1971) argued that in a society made of rational, self-interested 
individuals, a majority would accept a redistribution that improves the position of the worse off in a 
society. An emphasis on equality of opportunities – as opposed to equality of outcomes – has 
characterised recent conceptualisations, as in Roemer (1998). Moving beyond such models, 
Amartya Sen has pointed out the complexity of inequality, rooted in societies’ historical contexts, in 
the capabilities available to people, families and social groups in the pursuit of their objectives, in 
the concrete opportunities individuals have to make decisions about their lives (Sen, 1992, 2009), 
broadening the view of justice and the rationale for redistribution and action against specific 
sources of inequality. Such perspectives on inequality, while maintaining a strong ethical emphasis 
on economic and social justice, have highlighted the complexity of economic and social 
mechanisms leading to inequalities in advanced countries. 
These approaches have moved together with a broader recognition that inequality cannot be 
confined to incomes and economic factors, and that access to education and health, as well as social 
conditions play a role in shaping inequalities among individuals. While the multidimensionality of 
inequality has been recognized, major challenges remain in conceptualising and measuring such 
variety of factors. At the same time, incomes appear to be highly related to several of these social 
conditions and economic inequality remains a major field of research. Nevertheless, an opening to 
interdisciplinary approaches is needed, with collaboration between economists, sociologists, 
political scientists, statisticians and philosophers, just to mention the ones most actively involved 
(see Grusky and Kanbur, 2006). 
The context in which inequality can be investigated has also evolved, moving from national to 
international perspectives. World income inequalities between countries and regions have been 
investigated in their evolution over time (Milanovic, 2005; Cornia, 2004; World Bank, 2006); key 
determinants have been identified in the different phases of countries’ development, in the global 
flows of knowledge, trade and finance, or in countries’ positions in the core or periphery of the 
world system (Arrighi, 1991).  
These studies contributed to the debate on the distribution of the benefits of globalisation and 
questioned the economic rationale, the social sustainability and the political acceptability of 
extremely wide income inequalitites at the global level. The difficulty of empirical investigations on 
inequalities among the world’s individuals has led to approaches that have either focused on 
differences among countries (considering their average per capita income), or on inequalities among 
individuals within a country. While in the rest of this paper we will focus on the latter, the two 
dimensions have to be considered as complementary approaches needed to understand the dynamics 
and patterns of unequal economic outcomes of increasingly global processes. 
Alongside globalisation, the rise of finance has introduced a new dimension in the studies on 
inequality. In the last two decades, the growing shares of profits and financial rents have polarised 
income distribution in advanced countries. A new literature has focused on top incomes, combining 6 
 
rents, profits and unprecedented high compensations for top managers and “superstars” in selected 
professions, from entertainment to sports (Atkinson and Picketty, 2007).  
In parallel, the rapid accumulation of financial and real estate assets by the richest individuals has 
attracted attention to inequalities in wealth, and an emerging stream of research is now exploring – 
with a major effort in data collection - wealth disparities and their link to inequalities in incomes 
(Sierminska, Brandolini and Smeeding, 2006). 
Over the last two decades inequality among wage-earners has also increased substantially – even 
once we exclude the effects of top managers; a large literature within the economic mainstream 
developed, arguing that the rising wages of highly skilled white collars reflected the greater labour 
productivity of workers capable to use the new Information and Communication Technologies and 
that wage inequalities were the result of skill biased technical change (Acemoglu, 2002). These 
studies ignored that advanced countries were not experiencing a generalised “upskilling” of jobs, 
from blue to white collar employment, but rather a polarisation was taking place with more jobs for 
managers and professionals and for the lowest skills – manual workers and ancillary jobs. Losses in 
jobs and wages were concentrated among office clerks (the low skilled white collars) and skilled 
factory workers (the most qualified blue collar employees). While technological change does have 
an impact on inequality, it is arguably more complex that the skill bias view (Nascia and Pianta, 
2009) and is combined with the effect of increasing foreign trade and investment (Feenstra and 
Hanson, 2003).  
Moreover, higher wage inequality cannot be explained without consideration of developments in 
labour markets, including the rapid rise of temporary and precarious jobs, the effects of migrations, 
the fall of unionisation and of trade union influence (Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa, 2008). More 
generally, the last two decades have seen broad changes in capital-labour relations that have been 
summarized as labour's “defeat” in income distribution (Glyn, 2006). 
Today’s inequality in advanced countries is therefore the result of a set of different and complex 
mechanisms that have been investigated – conceptually and empirically – by a new wave of studies 
(Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000; Franzini and Pianta; Salverda et al, 2009); the rest of this paper 
provides a map for understanding this complexity and multidimensionality, and suggests an 
interpretation of the major mechanisms and consequences of economic inequality.   
Summing up this trajectory of the views of inequality, we can suggest that economic analysis has 
moved from a focus on the functional distribution of income between capital and labour – typical of 
periods of industrialisation with clear class divisions – to a focus on the personal distribution, 
where individuals’ incomes in advanced economies are shaped by a variety of factors – education, 
professional skills, gender and ethnicity, as well as class. The assumption in the last two decades 
was that advanced economies and widespread education offered equality of opportunities for all, 
and that social mobility had become the rule rather than the exception. More recent studies however 
have disputed such views with evidence that inequality persists from one generation to the next, and 
that (apparently) more equal opportunities do not reduce unequal outcomes in income distribution 
among individuals.  
These challenges – the complexity of the mechanisms leading to inequality, its multidimensionality 
and need for interdisciplinary approaches, the importance of its inter-generational persistence and 
the need for fresh policy apporaches – are discussed in detail in the rest of this paper. 
 
Concepts, measures and data  
 
Inequality is an apparently easy, but in fact a slippery concept. We need to define it carefully, 
measure it with appropriate data, and relate it to relevant phenomena. The concept of inequality can 
be used to assess distances between countries (as in world income inequalities); between social 
classes (as in the functional distribution of income); between workers with different skills and 
wages; between individuals or families with different incomes (before or after the effects of taxes 
and public expenditure). Distances can be measured in several dimensions, and inequality can refer 7 
 
to income or wealth, as well as to rights, capabilities, access to services, measures of wellbeing. 
Much progress has recently been made in measuring such distances, their level and changes over 
time. The most frequently used indicator is the Gini coefficient, that sums the distance from the 
average – the expected value in case of perfect equality - of units of observation ranked according 
to income. The Theil index has also been used as it allows a decomposition of key elements 
contributing to inequality. This section provides an overview of concepts, measures and major 
trends. 
 
World (and European) income inequalities  
 
Economic inequality between countries has been explored on the basis of three types of measures: 
differences between national per capita incomes; inequality between country averages weighted by 
population; and inequality among all the world’s individuals (Milanovic, 2005). Over the past 
century - considering Gini coefficients - there is a clear increase in the first definition of inequality, 
an increase followed by a moderate reduction since the 1960s in the second one, and an increase 
followed by a stability since the 1960s in the third one (ibid. p. 143).  
The latter measure – inequality among individuals living in different countries – appears as the most 
solid indicator, although it poses several methodological problems -  comparability of sources, 
conversion of currencies, consideration of purchasing power, choice of equivalence scales, etc. – 
and the adopted solution may influence results. A major improvement in this direction has been 
obtained at the European level, with studies on inequalities that have considered the EU as if it were 
a single country. Based on data around the year 2000, a first study found that inequality in the 
European Union is quite high but lower than in the US; the Gini index is equal to 0.33 in the EU25, 
while is 0.37 in the US (Brandolini, 2007). A more recent estimate based on a different 
methodology and on more recent data (2005) concludes that inequality in Europe is significantly 
higher and not much different from that in the US; the EU-wide Gini coefficient is 0.369, not very 
far from 0.372 which is the level for the US (Giammatteo, 2009). Even if such figures need further 
refinement, they support the conclusion that Europe as a whole is characterized by high inequality, 
with little difference from the US. The need to address high inequality is therefore a European-wide 
challenge and not a specific problem of few European countries with an “Anglo-Saxon” model of 
capitalism. 
 
Inequalities in the functional distribution and in disposable income within advanced countries 
 
Inequality between capital and labour is reflected in the functional distribution of income. A study 
of eight major advanced countries (Glyn, 2009) found that labour’s share ranges between 70 and 
80% of net national income; it has increased during the 1970s, and has fallen since the 1980s, 
shifting to capital a rough estimate of 10 percentage points of total income. However, calculations 
differ depending on the variables used (GDP, net income or value added of the private sector) and 
on methodologies adopted (for treating the financial sector, capital consumption, income of self 
employed, etc.). Moreover, data for the US show a substantial difference when the income of the 
top 1% of wage earners – that include top managers – is excluded from labour income; all employee 
compensation shows a modest decline since 1980, while compensation of the bottom 99% of wage 
earners experiences a fall of close to ten percentage points in the net value added of the business 
sector. In spite of methodological problems, a fundamental shift in capital-labour relations has 
emerged since the 1980s; profits have rebounded, financial rents have substantially increased, in a 
few countries a higher share has gone to the self-employed, and the wage share has fallen; the fall in 
labour’s compensation is parallel to the rise in personal income inequality (ibid., p.122). 
 
Economic inequality among individuals within countries is characterized by large and persistent 
differences in levels. Considering advanced countries, in the mid-2000’s the Gini coefficient on 8 
 
disposable monetary income for households was between 0.38 and 0.34 for the US, Italy and the 
UK; ranged between 0.32 and 0.28 for Japan, Spain, Korea, Germany and France, while Denmark 
and Sweden were the least unequal countries, with Gini values around 0,23 (OECD, 2008; 
Brandolini and Smeeding, 2008).  
Over the past 25 years almost all EU countries have experienced a worsening of economic 
inequality. The previous narrowing of disposable income distribution was reversed in the early 
1980s, giving way to a  generalized increase in inequality. Such an increase has been particularly 
strong in Finland, Norway, Germany, Portugal and Italy, as well as in the US. A rise in income 
shares by the top quintile of the income distribution (the richest 20% of households) has been a key 
determinant of greater inequalities in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria, and 
Italy, as well as in the US and Canada. In the last twenty years, the average annual growth of real 
incomes of the top quintile has been twice as large as  the one of the bottom quintile (the poorest 
20% of households) in Finland, Sweden, the UK, Germany, Italy, as well as in the US (OECD, 
2008).  
A different measure of inequality is the ratio between the income beyond which we find the richest 
ten percent of population and the upper limit of the poorer ten percent (P90/P10). For disposable 
incomes of families, such ratios in the mid-1980s were 5.9 in the US, 4 in Italy, 3.8 in the UK, 3.5 
in France, 3 in Germany, 2.7 in Sweden. Considering inequalities among wages and comparing 
1970 and 1990, the ratio has increased from 3.2 to 4.5 in the US, from 2.5 to 3.3 in the UK and has 
remained at 2.1 in Sweden (Picketty, 2002).  The recession that followed the international financial 
crisis of 2008 is likely to further exacerbate income inequalities and increase the problems of 
unemployment and poverty in many countries (ILO, 2009).  
 
Moving beyond Europe, a broad comparative study of advanced and developing countries (Cornia, 
2004) found that most countries – with the exception of Latin America and part of Sub-Saharan 
Africa – experienced decreasing inequalities from the 1950s to the 1970s, with a new rise since the 
1980s. Such a growth was particularly marked in post-Socialist countries of Eastern Europe, while a 
moderate rise is found since the 1980s in Asian economies and in most Latin American countries. 
In the largest Asian countries – China and India – a complex pattern has emerged, with rapidly 
rising incomes – and inequalities - in urban areas and a modest rise of incomes – and inequalities - 
among rural population (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Inequalities in wealth 
 
While most studies have focused on income inequality, new evidence has become available on the 
distribution of wealth (Jantti et al 2008; OECD 2008). The Gini coefficients on household wealth 
(net worth, equal to total assets less debt) in years around 2000 were 0.77 for the US, 0.73 for 
Germany, 0.67 for Canada, 0.62 for Sweden and 0.60 for Italy. Considering financial assets alone, 
the US climbs to 0.89 and Germany to 0.82. Non financial assets (including houses) are slightly less 
concentrated (0.73 in the US and 0.75 in Germany). In general, wealth appears to be twice as much 
concentrated as income in rich countries. In the US and Germany the net worth of the 90th 
percentile (the richest ten percent of households) is more than ten times the net worth of the median 
person (the person between the fifty per cent richer and the fifty per cent poorer); in Sweden the 
value is eight, in Italy four (considering the diffusion of home ownership). 
 
Inequalities in labour incomes and disposable incomes 
 
The high and growing inequalities in disposable incomes shown above are mainly the result of 
market processes. In almost all advanced countries the distribution of market income has become 
much more unequal between mid-80’s and mid-2000’s. Redistribution by the Welfare States has 9 
 
only partially offset this tendency, making the  worsening of inequality in disposable income less 
pronounced and generalized than inequality in market incomes.  
Several developments are responsible for higher market income inequality, the importance of each 
being different in each country. Among the more significant are:  inequality within self-employed, 
inequality between capital and labour, inequality within labour incomes. Almost everywhere in the 
Western world, the latter type of inequality has substantially increased.  
Mainstream interpretations have argued that this is largely due to differences in skills and human 
capital, but new research suggests that in most European countries inequality within groups of 
workers homogeneous in terms of education is very high (Franzini, 2010). More precisely, when a 
decomposition of inequality in labour incomes by educational attainments (considering three 
educational levels: lower secondary, upper secondary and tertiary) is carried out using the Theil 
index, the “between” component – comparing groups with different education – is much less 
important than the “within” component – inequalities among workers with the same education - that 
explain almost everywhere in European countries 80% or more of overall inequality. Labour 
income inequality not explained by human capital is important also for the analysis of how current 
and intergenerational inequalities interact.  
 
Current explanations of income inequalities 
 
In order to explore the complexity of the mechanisms shaping individuals’ incomes and the 
multidimensional nature of inequalities, we investigate in this section the existing explanations of 




The functional distribution of income between wages, profits and rents is a fundamental process 
shaping inequalities among social classes and groups receiving different types of income. We have 
already seen above that, since 1980, most advanced countries have experienced a significant 
reduction of the labour share in GDP, of the order of ten percentage points. What can be the forces 
leading to such a substantial distributional shift? Studies on the increase of capital income have 
identified a few factors. First, neoliberal policies of liberalisation of capital movements have led to 
a surge of capital flows - for foreign direct investment and for the acquisition of financial assets - 
driven by a search for higher profits and for inflating “shareholders’ value”, with the ability to elude 
the national taxation of profits and rents. Second, the growth of financial activities – the most 
profitable, mobile and volatile form of capital – has dominated investment patterns. The result is 
that in the US the ratio of aggregate profits of the financial sector to profits of non-financial 
activities has increased from 20 per cent in the 1970s to 50 percent after 2000 (Glyn, 2006, ch.3). 
The expansion of finance has led to the creation of increasingly complex markets for credit, stocks, 
bonds, real estate, currencies, futures, commodities, derivatives, etc., driven by a search for short-
term speculative gains and leading to major bubbles and to the major financial collapse of 2008. 
Since then, however, there is little evidence of a substantial reduction of the share of income 
appropriated by financial rents in major advanced countries. 
Conversely, the decline in the share of labour in the functional distribution of income appears to be 
the result of several factors. Real wages have fallen for most workers, in most countries and 
industries. Labour has been less able to capture an adequate share of the economy’s productivity 
gains; since 2003 one third of European workers has experienced a decline in real wages, and 
almost two thirds saw their wages growing, on average, less than their labour productivity 
(Bogliacino, 2009). This fall in labour share and the associated greater inequalities among wage 
earners have been investigated by a variety of studies on the role of technology, globalisation and 
labour markets; they are examined in turn. 
 10 
 
Technological change  
 
In advanced countries, technological change has been characterised by the emergence of the new 
techno-economic paradigm based on Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), with a 
growing role played by the production and use of knowledge, by R&D and innovation, and by the 
diffusion of new organizational forms (Freeman and Louca, 2001). This has led to the decline of old 
industries - often with a workforce of medium skilled, unionised workers - and the emergence of 
new industries and firms with high opportunitites for Schumpeterian profits associated to temporary 
monopolies due to technological advantages.  
The rising inequalities in jobs and wages have been addressed by a large literature within the 
economic mainstream suggesting that skill biased technical change is the main explanation 
(Acemoglu, 2002). The argument is that the diffusion of ICTs over the past twenty years has led to 
an upskilling of employees - measured by the ratio of white to blue collar workers, or years of 
education - and to higher wages for the workers with skills that are complementary to the new 
technologies (and therefore increase workers’ labour productivity).  
This interpretation rests on the idea that wage dispersion is rooted in technical change at the firm 
level, as innovative firms substitute low-skill workers with high-education, high-wage workers 
whose competences are complementary to ICTs. The mechanistic view of technology and its effects 
is a major limitation of this approach; all innovations are assumed to to incorporated in physical 
capital and are expected to be complementary to high skills. As a consequence, both the high-
skill/low-skill employment ratio and the wage premium associated to high skills are expected to 
increase, and are considered as the sole drivers of higher wage inequality.  
More careful analyses have shown that in fact a polarization of employment is taking place (Autor, 
Katz and Kearney, 2006; Moose and Manning, 2007), rather than a general upskilling, but a deeper 
understanding is needed of the diversity of patterns of technological change and of their 




The increasing international openness of economies – with greater flows of trade, knowledge and 
investment – is a major mechanism affecting the dynamics of wages and profits, as well as 
inequalities among employees.  
A large literature has shown that in advanced countries the relocation of production abroad (or even 
the threat of relocation) has depressed domestic wage dynamics, especially for blue collars and low-
skilled white collar workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 2003). In the new system of international 
production firms tend to maintain in advanced countries highly skilled activities of management. 
R&D and finance, with relatively few highly paid employees, while reducing jobs and wages for 
medium and low skilled office and factory workers, whose jobs are more liekly to be transferred in 
low wage developing countries; the outcome in rich countries is a rise in wage inequality, and 
greater polarisation of jobs and skills. 
Important effects have emerged also on the distribution between profits and wages. It has been 
argued that globalisation has doubled the labour force available in the world economy and lowered 
the overall capital/labour ratio, leading to a greater (relative) scarcity of capital, resulting in higher 
profits and lower wages (Freeman, 2009). The same analysis has shown that increasing trade, 
greater openness of national economies and tariff reductions are likely to contribute to greater 
income inequalities within countries. 
The effects of technology and international integration on employment and wages are closely 
connected, as firms facing international competition introduce more innovations, and more 
innovative firms have a competitive advantage in foreign markets. A study comparing the effects of 
technology and trade on the reduction of low skilled workers - in the case of US industries in the 11 
 
1990s – found that the impact of innovation was dominant, while international trade appeared to 
play a minor role (Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998).  
While the evidence is still fragmentary and the mechanisms at work are particularly complex, two 
decades of increasing international integration have led, in advanced countries, to a more polarised 
structure of employment and wages. Not enough attention, however, has been devoted to the skill 
composition of evolving employment structures, to the chances of upward mobility for the low 
skilled, and to the overall dynamics of inequality among wage earners. 
 
Labour market institutions 
 
Given the technology and production system in a country, labour market mechanisms influence 
wage dispersion among workers on the basis of education, skills, professional categories, types of 
labour contracts – permanent or temporary; full-time or part-time -, effects of migrations, presence 
of unions and, more generally, through the regulations of labour markets.  
In the last decade a major polarisation within labour markets of advanced countries has emerged 
between relatively few top managers (classified as employees, and not as capitalists) and “star 
professionals” that have obtained unprecedented high incomes. Conversely, the lower tail to the 
wage distribution has been further lowered by the diffusion in several countries - Italy, Spain, 
Ireland and Germany in particular - of part-time, temporary and outsourced work; this is the result 
of policies of precarisation of employment that have led to the emergence also in Europe of 
"working poor" - people with jobs who remain in conditions of poverty. However, little quantitative 
evidence is so far available on the effects of different labour contracts and migrations – for which 
limited data are available.  
On the other hand, increasing attention has been devoted to the impact of labour market institutions, 
considering the forms and degree of unionisation, the presence of national bargaining or minimum 
wage legislation, and other regulations of labour markets. Research has found that a strong union 
presence is associated to lower wage inequality - but causality links are not clear – and bargaining 
coverage and minimum wage are potential substitutes (Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa, 2008; Visser 
and Checchi, 2009). The fall in unionisation in the US and Europe, the weaker bargaining power of 
unions and legislation that has fragmented labour contracts and reduced bargaining coverage appear 
to be all factors that can contribute to explain the rise of wage inequality among employees. 
 
The role of welfare states  
 
Inequalities in terms of disposable income and living standards are the results of state actions that 
can mitigate the outcomes of market processes. Governments can act through taxation, social 
transfers and the provision of in-kind services. National experiences widely differ, according to 
welfare regimes. Public social spending ranges from about 25 percent of GDP in Nordic and 
Continental Europe regimes to 19 per cent in Anglo-Saxon countries, where a high share of smaller 
overall transfers (43 per cent) is targeted to the bottom quintile of income earners. While there are 
difficulties in assessing the impact of in-kind transfers, estimates of the reduction of inequalities due 
to the presence of public services – in particular universal access to education and health – suggest 
that the average reduction of the Gini coefficient on disposable income is 37 per cent in countries of 
the Nordic welfare regime and 24 percent in both the Anglo-Saxon and Continental Europe (where 
Italy and Spain are included) groups (Esping-Andersen and Myles, 2009).  
Recent policy changes – efforts to limit high public deficits and debt, reduced taxation, privatisation 
of services, reduction of social rights - have weakened the extent and the effectiveness of 
redistribution through the welfare state. They result from concerns on the negative effects on 
growth in open economies that may come from high public deficits, progressive taxation and a 
generous welfare system. In this way, such policy changes have contributed to the increase in 
inequality shown above.   12 
 
 
New explanations for the mechanisms of inequality 
 
In order to overcome the limitations of previous approaches, we identify in this section key 
mechanisms at the root of today’s inequality. We summarize here the concepts and analytical 
perspective needed to investigate them, and the preliminary evidence that is available.  
 
The importance of countries’ history and institutions 
 
Too much of the current literature deals with inequality as an outcome of market processes that are 
indifferent to institutions and history. Conversely, the most careful studies have pointed out the 
persistence of differences in levels of inequality (and in the policy tools for countering it) across 
advanced countries. The focus of our argument is on European countries, that share broadly similar 
institutions, policy-setting mechanisms and, in most cases, even a currency, in spite of persistently 
different welfare models. Much bigger differences exist with advanced countries outside Europe 
and such institutional factors should be considered in a possible extension of the analysis we 
propose here.  
 
The rise of top incomes 
 
We have already seen that in advanced countries a major part of today’s inequality is due to the fast 
rise of top incomes – those of the richest 1% or 5% of the population – that result from a 
combination of sources incomes that have all experienced rapid increases in the past two decades 
(Atkinson and Picketty, 2007).  
Within “wage” incomes an unprecedented high compensation has gone to top managers and 
“superstars” in selected professions – lawyers, architects, well-known people in the media, 
entertainment and sports. The richest individuals have also benefitted from the rise of the share of 
profits in national income, and from the exceptionally high financial rents fuelled by speculative 
gains in increasingly complex (and fragile) financial markets. At the same time, traditional national 
policies that had contained the rise of top incomes have been removed: inheritance taxes have been 
cancelled or greatly reduced in most countries; the progressive nature of income taxes has been 
reduced and tax rates on top incomes have been cut everywhere; tax loopholes have been granted to 
firms and rich individuals. The liberalisation of international financial flows – and the lack of fiscal 
harmonisation even in Europe - has also contributed to this outcome, with increasing opportunities 
for the rich to report their incomes in “tax heavens” with minimal tax rates.  
All these phenomena have their origin in the neoliberal policies of deregulation and liberalisation 
started in the 1980s and have created entirely new mechanisms of (extreme) inequality unknown in 
the previous decades. Moreover, the overlapping of their effects has been dramatic, and has led to 
the booming of incomes of the richest individuals – even in the recession that has followed the 
financial crisis of 2008. The economic and policy-related mechanisms that have skewed the 
distribution of income in favour of the richest individuals require specific studies linking the variety 
of factors that have played a role in these developments. 
 
The diversity of technological change and the polarisation of jobs, skills and wages 
 
Changes in technology  – together with those in international integration, production systems and 
labour relations - are indeed affecting the evolution of jobs, skills and wages, but in ways less 
deterministic than those argued by the skill biased technical change view. Building on neo-
Schumpeterian perspectives, we can argue, instead, that technological change is highly uneven 
across industries and it is important to distinguish between strategies of technological 
competitiveness based on new products, and of cost competitiveness based on new processes, 13 
 
considering their different effects on jobs, skills, wages and profits. A few recent studies have 
examined the operation of these mechanisms in Europe. 
In investigating the skill composition of employment, the idea of a general upskilling of the 
workforce does not stand a closer scrutiny. When the white collar/blue collar ratio or the high/low 
education ratio are replaced by data on employees broken down in the main professional groups - 
Managers, Clerks, Craft workers and Manual workers – a clear pattern of polarisation emerges. A 
study on 36 manufacturing and service industries for five EU countries for the period 2000-2003 
shows that jobs creation is found for managers (+2% a year) and manual workers (+1.2%) only, 
while job losses affect clerks (-0.2%) and skilled workers (-2%). The explanations of such 
dynamics is rooted in the different technological strategies of industries; product innovation and 
high education lead to more jobs for high skill categories; cost competitiveness and process 
innovation strategies destroy jobs for craft workers (Nascia and Pianta, 2009). 
An investigation on the dynamics of profits and wages in manufacturing industries - covering ten 
European countries in the period 1994-2001- (Pianta and Tancioni, 2008) has shown that the real 
growth of wages per employee was less than half that of total profits. In high innovation sectors, 
profits increased by close to 8 per cent a year, three time as fast as wages. In low innovation 
industries profits growth was 3.5 per cent, again more than twice that of wages. The parellel 
explanations of profit and wage dynamics show that the distributional conflict is a strong factor in 
the evolution of incomes and that both profits and wages grow on the basis of increases in labour 
productivity. Wages tend to grow faster in the sectors where innovation expenditure (largely due to 
wages for high skill researchers) is higher, while profits are driven both by the importance of new 
products and market power, and by restructuring through the diffusion of new processes and wage 
depressing job reductions. The lesson of such evidence is that technological change has the general 
effect of favouring profits over wages. Profits increase through separate mechanisms in industries 
relying on technological or cost competitiveness; conversely, wages grow only when innovation is 
associated to higher skills of labour; the result is greater inequality rooted in the functional 
distribution of incomes (Pianta and Tancioni, 2008). 
Efforts to explain wage inequalities have usually considered factors such as education, skills and 
use of ICTs. A study at the industry level – covering ten manufacturing and service sectors in seven 
European countries – (Croci Angelini, Farina and Pianta, 2009) has found that higher wage 
polarisation is found within industries with strong product innovation, a fast employment dynamics 
and high shares of workers with university education; sectors with greater opportunities for 
expanding markets and jobs are likely to show increasing wage inequalities, as managers and high 
skill workers can obtain part of the rents from innovation. Conversely, wage compression is typical 
of industries characterised by the diffusion of new process technologies, high shares of workers 
with secondary education who can increase their competences and productivity by working on new 
machinery, obtaining higher relative wages (usually in a context of relatively high unionisation and 
labour market regulation), leading to reduced wage disparities. 
While technological change is an important mechanism shaping inequalities, these approaches show 
that different technological strategies play significant and different roles in affecting the distribution 
between profits and wages, and inequalities among employees in terms of jobs, skills and wages.  
 
The role of human capital and inequality not explained by education 
 
Mainstream approaches argue that human capital is a major determinant of workers’ productivity 
and earnings, in a view that is coherent with both market efficiency and equality of opportunities. 
An increase in wage inequalities – so goes the argument – simply reflects the higher productivity 
and compensation of workers with the highest human capital or education.  
Recent research on European countries has found, instead, that in the mechanisms behind wage 
inequality education plays a modest role. When we investigate inequality in labour incomes of 
workers with different educational attainments (considering three educational levels: lower 14 
 
secondary, upper secondary and tertiary) using the Theil index, the inequality among workers with 
the same education is much more important than the disparity found between different educational 
groups, explaining almost everywhere 80% or more of overall inequality (Franzini, 2010). 
The explanation of such diversity in labour incomes given the same educational attainment can be 
found in three types of factors: the “structural” specificities of workers’ jobs; the types of labour 
contracts and labour markets conditions; the “personal” (and family-related) characteristics of 
individual workers. The former reflect the strong differences across industries and firms in terms of 
knowledge, R&D, nature of innovation and market power that result in workers’ productivity and 
end up in earning disparities. The second factor – with an increasingly important role – is related to 
workers’ labour contracts; in Europe employees with tertiary education but with a temporary or part 
time contract have a considerable probability of ending in the lowest part of the distribution of 
income. The third factor points out the role of competences and opportunities acquired not through 
an education accessible to all, but rather from the family background of individuals; a number of 
studies have shown that the education and profession of parents are key determinants of the 
educational attainments and earnings of sons and daughters; in most cases, the influence of the 
family of origin is stronger than educational levels is predicting individuals’ incomes.  
 
The relationship between current inequality and its intergenerational transmission  
 
Parental income and wealth are important factors in determining individuals’ life chances, 
educational attainments and earned wages. Several studies – ranging from economics to psychology 
- offer good but partial explanations of this influence; in particular, economic models stress the 
importance of human capital  which is considered both a crucial determinant of individual earnings, 
and a variable on which family conditions exert a major influence.  
The approach of the economic mainstream – rooted in the “the family investment theory” of Becker 
and Tomes (1979) – states that a family’s income and wealth are the key means for investing in 
human capital in presence of imperfect capital markets. It is assumed that individual earnings 
depend on the human capital acquired through education (given a rate of return on accumulated 
human capital), and that the latter depends on family’s income (Grawe, Mulligan 2002). 
Available empirical evidence lends support to the second assumption, even if there is a strong 
variability across countries. The first assumption is more controversial, despite the insistence of 
recent models – as we have seen above - on explaining increasing wage inequalities with a higher 
skill premium due to an increase in the rate of return to human capital.  
In fact, in advanced countries income disparities across generations are highly related to current 
inequalities, showing a persistence – rooted in family wealth, privilege and networks of connections 
- stronger than the one expected by the advocates of social mobility through "equal opportunities" 
and market processes. The countries with higher current inequality seem to be the same where the 
intergenerational transmission of inequality is higher (D’Addio 2007; Causa e Johansson 2009).  
The few available explanations of this correlation are, once again, based upon human capital.  An 
increase in  the rate of return on human capital is expected to lead to higher inequality between 
workers with different endowments of  human capital and to a stronger influence of family income 
on individual earnings, given that the “transmitted” asset – human capital – now has a higher 
economic value.  In other words a single factor – the rate of return to human capital – is assumed to 
explain both higher inequality and higher intergenerational transmission (Hout 2004; Hassler, Mora 
e Zeira 2007). 
One weak point of this explanation has already been mentioned: the large residual of inequality in 
labour income left unexplained by human capital. Identifying the other factors contributing to such 
inequality is, therefore, extremely important also for a more complete understanding of the 
mechanisms of intergenerational transmission and their relationship with current inequality. In 
particular, a crucial issue to be addressed is whether such factors  depend on family background.  15 
 
Recent empirical research suggests not only that labour incomes not explained by education and 
human capital is substantial, but also that this residual is positively correlated to variables 
representing the economic conditions of the family background (Franzini, Raitano 2009; Raitano, 
Vona 2010). The quality of education, the transmission of “soft skills” or network effects may 
account for such patterns.  
 
Countering inequalities and the logic of redistribution  
 
The lessons of previous analyses can shed new light on the deeper roots of inequality and on the 
ways to counter it. Besides market mechanisms, power relations and political economy mechanisms 
appear to play a role in enforcing income disparities and in reproducing inequality from one 
generation to the next. These issues raise questions on the meaning and feasibility of a society based 
on equality of opportunity, which is considered by many thinkers as the prototype of a fair society. 
In particular, current inequality may appear as a fetter on equality of opportunity and the latter 
cannot be achieved if the former is not aptly reduced.    
 
Why inequality matters 
 
The focus of this paper is a comprehensive explanation of the new nature of economic inequality in 
today’s capitalism. We investigate key mechanisms and their interrelations, while leaving the 
consequences of inequality – economic, social and political – on the side of our analysis. But 
behind the question “why does inequality increases?” there is the deeper question “why does 
inequality matter?”, and we need to briefly address it because this issue too has become more 
difficult and complex in recent decades. 
Liberal perspective have long argued that “equality of opportunities” is what matters and that 
disparities following from such a condition are socially acceptable and economically efficient. In 
other words, “this inequality does not matter”, from an ethical, political or economic viewpoint. 
We have shown that advanced economies in the last decades have remained far from equal 
opportunities and that the liberal justification is supported by little evidence on the economic 
benefits in terms of faster growth that can be associated to high inequality. 
The point we want to raise here, however, goes beyond such traditional argument and focuses on 
the novelty of today’s inequality. In fact, the new nature of today’s inequality is changing the frame 
of the debate in at least three aspects.  
 
First, we have shown that the mechanisms producing inequality in advanced countries have become 
more complex - investing the type of education, position in employment, family background, etc. – 
and this is likely to produce economic and social outcomes characterised by a much greater 
fragmentation along class, status, gender, education, regional and local identities. Individuals’ and 
families’ economic conditions are likely to be determined by a greater variety of factors on which 
they have less and less control. It not just the high level of inequality that may threaten social 
cohesion. This new nature of inequality matters because the diversity of  processes increase the 
effects on disparities of outcomes and social fragmentation, with higher uncertainty and sense of 
powerlessness of an ever larger share of people, posing a more serious danger to social cohesion 
and stability of countries. In turn, the complexity of these mechanisms make policy responses to 
high inequality more difficult and less effective. 
 
Second, today’s inequality is largely shaped by the extreme rise of top incomes - earning profits, 
financial rents and “superstar” compensations – with an increasingly polarised pattern of 
distribution of incomes and wealth. This is associated to a collapse in the opportunities for 
education-driven social mobility and to a rise of the persistence of inequalities across generations. 
Economic privilege is becoming more extreme and is increasingly inherited – again a return to a 16 
 
feature of inequality that was typical of a century ago. An inequality of such nature has important 
consequences on the economy and society. In economic terms, the “neo-classical” argument that 
inequality may contribute to faster economic growth by rewarding individuals with higher merit and 
capacities loses whatever is left of its credibility, as the incomes and wealth of the richest people are 
less the result of successful business growth (that may benefit the whole economy), and more the 
outcome of financial speculation and family privilege (a net burden on the economy). Conversely, 
the entrepreneurial efforts of middle and low-income individuals are likely to be reduced by the 
lower prospects of social mobility. In social terms, these developments are hollowing the meaning 
of “equality of opportunities” and the mechanisms of social mobility and change; society is shaped 
by more rigid social hierarchies, with features typical of a “feudal” society (including the growing 
number of people employed in the personal service of the very rich). This new nature of inequality 
matters because it cannot be justified even by the traditional liberal argument, and may have highly 
negative effects on the economic and social prospects of countries. 
 
Third, the economic and social conditions that define specific patterns of inequality are shaped by a 
complex frame defined by political institutions – supranational and national – and by the political 
processes leading to policy making and redistribution. While we usually think of such “frames” as 
“neutral” and independent from a given patter of inequality, they in fact can be heavily affected by 
highly unequal societies, further exacerbating disparities. 
Several contributions have explored this issue. The “radical democratic” approach proposed by 
Nancy Fraser (2005) defines justice as “parity of participation” and identifies unjust outcomes in 
three cases: when economic inequality leads to distributive injustice; when social hierarchies and 
cultural values lead to status inequalities and lack of “recognition”; when political structures – 
global and national – lead to a lack of equal representation. The latter are particularly important as 
they “frame” the way distribution and recognition issues can be addressed by the political process. 
Addressing global inequalities and world poverty, Pogge (2002) suggests that today’s world is 
characterised by “radical inequality”, defined as follows: the conditions of the worse-off are very 
bad both in absolute and relative terms; they have little or no possibility to overcome a hardship 
pervading all their lives; the inequality is avoidable, as redistribution could improve the conditions 
of the worse-off without worsening too much those of better-off. A key factor in shaping such 
radical inequality at the global level are global institutional rules, that far from being “neutral”, are 
the result of the balance of interests and political power of the different actors involved, with a 
dominant role of the interests of rich countries and of the élites of poor countries. Once the rules are 
set, given the unequal economic and political resources, it may become very difficult to change 
them through the political process. In this way, according to Pogge, inequality matters because it  
affects the public debate and policy making, preventing a return to low inequality arrangements and 
becoming therefore irreversible.  
The relevance of institutional frameworks and the influence of high inequality on political and 
economic outcomes has also been emphasised by Wade (2004) for inequalities at the global level, 
and by Pontusson (2005) - following the “varieties of capitalisms” approach - in the comparison 
between the US and European models. The case of the US - with its high inequality and 
overwhelming political influence of the rich - has been explored by Phillips (2003), Bartels (2008) 
and Hacker and Pierson (2010), who have pointed out the dangerous effects on the functioning of 
democratic processes, on political equality and policy outcomes that systematically favour high 
income groups, further deepening inequality. 
These different contributions reach the common conclusion that inequality matters because it   
affects the institutional setting and the political process – at the global and national levels – leading 
to a failure of democracy, to disparities in political rights and to “irreversible inequality”. 
 
These three dimensions of today’s inequalities provide further evidence on the unacceptable nature 
of such disparities. They outline new ethical, political and economic answers to the question “why 17 
 
does inequality matter?” and support the need to address them with appropriate and comprehensive 




The complexity and multidimensionality of today’s inequality clearly emerge from the analysis of 
the previous sections. To the fundamental divide between capital and labour in the distribution of 
income between social classes and groups, new mechanisms have been added, that have fuelled 
income inequalities among individuals, rooted in the rise of top incomes, technological change, 
international production, labour markets, influence of families of origin and lack of 
intergenerational mobility.  
We can now propose an overall interpretation of the trajectory of inequality. It starts with the 
functional income distribution that leads to inequalities in factor incomes, with an increasing divide 
between the growing share of profits and financial rents – free to move across national borders, 
escape taxation and search for speculative gains – and the dwindling share of wages, nation-bound 
and unable to escape taxes. The specificity of top incomes – that combine rents, profits and 
“superstar” labour compensation complicates this picture with the effects of pro-rich policy 
changes. 
Inequalities have also strongly increased within wages, resulting from several factors. Education has 
an obvious influence, but however plays a much smaller role than mainstream views would expect. 
Skill differences are increasingly important, and need to be examined in the context of specific 
professional groups, rather than with wide generalisations. Industry specificities, technology and 
international production do play a role, but in complex ways, depending on the nature of innovative 
strategies, local competences, market power and demand dynamics. Labour market arrangements – 
unionisation, presence of minimum wages or national contracts, diffusion of temporary or part-time 
labour contracts, etc. – are increasingly important factors in explaining the low pay of many young 
and low-skilled workers. Outside labour markets and the opportunities for social mobility promised 
by education, the family of origin remains a major determinant of individuals’ education and 
incomes, with an increasingly strong persistence of inequality across generations. 
What role has been played in this context by policies? The redistributive effects of taxation, social 
incomes – pensions and transfers - and provision of public services provided outside the market 
shape inequalities among families in terms of net disposable incomes and standard of living. 
However, the reduced spending capacity of national governments, the weakening of progressive 
taxation – and the ability of top incomes to escape taxation –, the spreading privatisation of public 
services have all weakened the redistributive effects of public policies. 
The combination of such “forces of inequality” has returned advanced countries to the economic 
disparities of a century ago. The interpretation we provide offers a new explanation of the nature of 
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